

**No. 12-2673**

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**In the United States Court Of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit**

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Autocam Corporation, et al.,  
*Plaintiffs-Appellants,*

v.

Kathleen Sebelius, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S.  
Department of Health and Human Services, et al.,  
*Defendants-Appellees.*

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On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western  
District of Michigan, Judge Robert J. Jonker

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Brief of *Amici Curiae* Americans United for Separation of Church  
and State, Union for Reform Judaism, Central Conference of American  
Rabbis, Women of Reform Judaism, and the Hindu American  
Foundation In Support of Appellees and Affirmance

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

## Disclosure of Corporate Affiliations and Financial Interest

Sixth Circuit

Case Number: 12-2673

Case Name: Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius

Name of counsel: Gregory M. Lipper

Pursuant to 6th Cir. R. 26.1, Americans United for Separation of Church and State  
*Name of Party*

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s/ Gregory M. Lipper

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
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Case Name: Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius

Name of counsel: Gregory M. Lipper

Pursuant to 6th Cir. R. 26.1, Central Conference of American Rabbis  
*Name of Party*

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Table of Contents

Table of Authorities .....iii

Identity and Interests of *Amici Curiae*..... 1

Summary of Argument..... 3

Background ..... 7

Argument ..... 11

I. The Federal Insurance Regulations Impose Only an Incidental, Attenuated Burden on Plaintiffs’ Religious Exercise ..... 11

    A. Plaintiffs Do Not Establish A Substantial Burden Merely By Alleging One ..... 12

    B. The Connection Between Plaintiffs and Contraception is Incidental and Attenuated ..... 16

        1. Employees’ health insurance is provided not by the individual Plaintiffs, but by their secular, for-profit corporation. .... 17

        2. Contraception is only one benefit within a comprehensive insurance plan ..... 21

        3. Contraception is used and financed only after an employee’s independent decision ..... 23

    C. Autocam May At Any Time Contract With a Third-Party Insurance Company To Provide Health Coverage ..... 27

II. The Application of RFRA To Such Incidental, Attenuated Burdens Would Risk Imposing Significant Hardship on Third Parties, In This and Other Cases..... 30

    A. RFRA Does Not Authorize Plaintiffs To Impose Their Religious Views on the Corporation’s Employees..... 30

B. Plaintiffs’ Argument, If Accepted, Would Enable Employers  
To Restrict Employees’ Access to Medical Care Other Than  
Contraception and Could Undermine Other Civil Rights  
Laws..... 34

Conclusion..... 37

Certificate of Compliance .....

Certificate of Service .....

Designation of Relevant District Court Documents .....

Table of Authorities

**Cases**

*American Jewish Congress v. Corp. for National & Community Service*,  
399 F.3d 351 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ..... 24

*Annex Medical, Inc. v. Sebelius*,  
No. 13-1118 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) ..... 12

*Board of Education v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens*,  
496 U.S. 226 (1990) ..... 22–23

*Braunfeld v. Brown*,  
366 U.S. 599 (1961) ..... 29

*Catholic Charities v. Superior Court*,  
85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004) ..... 32–33

*Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King*,  
533 U.S. 158 (2001) ..... 17

*Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago*,  
342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003) ..... 14

*Clark v. United Technologies Automotive, Inc.*,  
594 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 1999) ..... 18

*Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius*,  
No. 13-1144 (3d Cir. Feb. 7, 2013) ..... 12, 19

*Cutter v. Wilkinson*,  
544 U.S. 709 (2005) ..... 33–34

*Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith*,  
494 U.S. 872 (1990) ..... 32

*Estate of Thornton v. Caldor*,  
472 U.S. 703 (1985) ..... 33–34

*Gilardi v. Sebelius*,  
\_\_ F. Supp. 2d \_\_, 2013 WL 781150  
(D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2013) ..... 20

*Gilardi v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services*,  
No. 13-5069 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 21, 2013) ..... 11–12

*Goehring v. Brophy*,  
94 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996) ..... 14–15, 24–25

*Grote v. Sebelius*,  
\_\_ F.3d \_\_, 2013 WL 362725  
(7th Cir. Jan. 30, 2013) ..... 12, 29

*Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund*,  
493 U.S. 365 (1990) ..... 28

*Henderson v. Kennedy*,  
253 F.3d 12 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ..... 15–16

*Hills & Dales General Hospital v. Pantig*,  
812 N.W.2d 793 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) ..... 18–19

*Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius*,  
No. 12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) ..... 12, 23

*Kaemmerling v. Lappin*,  
553 F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ..... 15

*Korte v. Sebelius*,  
No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) ..... 12

*Lawrence v. Texas*,  
539 U.S. 558 (2003) ..... 6

*Living Water Church of God v. Charter Township*,  
258 F. App’x 729 (6th Cir. 2007) ..... 14

*Meridia Products Liability Litigation v. Abbott Laboratories*,  
447 F.3d 861 (6th Cir. 2006)..... 25–26

*Michigan Carpenters Council Health & Welfare Fund  
v. C.J. Rogers, Inc.*,  
933 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1991)..... 18

*National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius*,  
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)..... 7

*O’Brien v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services*,  
No. 12-3357 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012)..... 12

*Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia*,  
515 U.S. 819 (1995) ..... 22, 29

*Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States*,  
326 U.S. 432 (1946) ..... 19

*St. Agnes Hospital v. Riddick*,  
748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990) ..... 32

*Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock*,  
489 U.S. 1 (1989) ..... 33

*Thompson v. Western States Medical Center*,  
535 U.S. 357 (2002) ..... 25

*Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison*,  
432 U.S. 63 (1977)..... 31

*United States v. Lee*,  
455 U.S. 252 (1982) ..... 21, 31

*Wisconsin v. Yoder*,  
406 U.S. 205 (1972) ..... 31

*Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind*,  
474 U.S. 481 (1986) ..... 26

*Zelman v. Simmons-Harris*,  
 536 U.S. 639 (2002) ..... 24

**Statutes**

26 U.S.C. § 4980H..... 7  
 29 U.S.C. § 1002..... 28  
 29 U.S.C. § 1132..... 28  
 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 ..... 7, 21–22  
 42 U.S.C. § 1320d ..... 28  
 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 ..... 3, 11  
 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc ..... 14  
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,  
 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) ..... 7

**Regulations**

45 C.F.R. § 147.130..... 9  
 45 C.F.R. § 164.508..... 27, 28  
 45 C.F.R. § 164.510..... 27, 28  
 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538 (June 17, 2010) ..... 9  
 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012)..... 7  
 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501 (Mar. 21, 2012) ..... 9  
 78 Fed. Reg. 8456 (Feb. 6, 2013) ..... 9

**Legislative Materials**

139 Cong. Rec. E1234-01 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) ..... 30

139 Cong. Rec. S14350-01 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993)..... 13, 30–31

S. Rep. No. 103-111 (1993),  
*reprinted in* 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892..... 14

**Other**

Brief for Americans United for Separation of Church and State  
 et al., as *Amici Curiae* Supporting Respondents,  
*Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal*,  
 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (No. 04-1084), 2005 WL 2237539..... 1

Catherine Easterbrook & Guy Maddern, *Procine and Bovine  
 Surgical Products*, 143 *Archives of Surgery* 366 (2008)..... 34

Center for American Progress, *The High Costs of Birth Control*  
 (2012), *available at* [http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-  
 content/uploads/issues/2012/02/pdf/BC\\_costs.pdf](http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/02/pdf/BC_costs.pdf) ..... 27

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29..... 1

Tara M. Hoesli, et al., *Effects of Religious and Personal Beliefs  
 on Medication Regimen Design*, 34 *Orthopedics* 292 (2011)... 34–35

Julie Rovner, *Morning-After Pills Don’t Cause Abortion, Studies Say*,  
*All Things Considered* (Feb. 21, 2013),  
[http://www/npr.org/blogs/health/2013/02/22/172595689/  
 morning-after-pills-dont-cause-abortion-studies-say](http://www/npr.org/blogs/health/2013/02/22/172595689/morning-after-pills-dont-cause-abortion-studies-say) ..... 8

Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822),  
*reprinted in* 9 *The Writings of James Madison*  
 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1910)..... 36–37

S. Pirzada Sattar, *To The Editor*, 53 *Psychiatric Services*  
 213 (2002) ..... 34

*USPSTF A and B Recommendations*, U.S. Preventive Services  
 Task Force, [http://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.  
 org/uspstf/uspsabrecs.htm](http://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/uspstf/uspsabrecs.htm) (last visited Mar. 13, 2013) ..... 22

Identity and Interests of *Amici Curiae*

Americans United for Separation of Church and State is a national, nonsectarian public-interest organization, which seeks to (1) advance the free-exercise rights of individuals and religious communities to worship as they see fit, and (2) preserve the separation of church and state as a vital component of democratic government. Americans United was founded in 1947 and has more than 120,000 members and supporters.<sup>1</sup>

Americans United has long supported legal exemptions that reasonably accommodate religious practice. *See, e.g.*, Brief for Americans United for Separation of Church and State et al., as *Amici Curiae* Supporting Respondents, *Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal*, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (No. 04-1084), 2005 WL 2237539 (supporting exemption, for Native American religious practitioners, from federal drug laws). Consistent with its support for the separation of church and state, however, Americans United opposes

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<sup>1</sup> Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c)(5), *amici* state the following: (1) no party's counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, and (2) no party, party's counsel, or person other than *amici*, their members, or their counsel, contributed money intended to fund the brief's preparation or submission.

the recognition of exemptions for organizations or individuals when those exemptions would impose harm on innocent third parties.

The Union for Reform Judaism has 900 congregations across North America, and these congregations include 1.5 million Reform Jews. The membership of the Central Conference of American Rabbis includes more than 1,800 Reform rabbis. The Women of Reform Judaism represents more than 65,000 women in nearly 500 women's groups in North America and around the world. Each of these organizations believes that religious freedom has thrived throughout United States history due to the country's commitment to religious liberty, but each also supports women's access to healthcare and ability to make their own reproductive health decisions. Jewish tradition teaches that healthcare is the most important communal service, and therefore should be available to all without discrimination; every woman is entitled to access contraception as a matter of basic rights and fundamental dignity.

The Hindu American Foundation is an advocacy group providing a Hindu American voice. The Foundation addresses global and domestic issues concerning Hindus, such as religious liberty, hate crimes, and

human rights. Although Hindus consider conception to be a revered duty for those in the householder stage of life, contraception is not banned. Indeed, Hindu scripture provides remedies for both preventing and facilitating conception.

Appellants and Appellees have consented to the filing of this brief.

### Summary of Argument

Federal health-insurance regulations, adopted to implement the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, require most employers to provide employees with insurance that covers a full range of procedures and services, including contraception. Plaintiffs argue that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, should be interpreted to exempt Autocam Corporation and Autocam Medical (collectively, “Autocam”)—both of which are for-profit manufacturing corporations—from this requirement. But Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the requirement imposes a substantial burden on their religious exercise, as required to trigger strict scrutiny under RFRA. And the exemption they seek would authorize employers to intrude on private healthcare relationships, subjecting employees’ private medical decisions to employers’ religion-based vetoes.

Any burden imposed on Plaintiffs’ religious exercise, however, is at most incidental and attenuated. Both Congress and the courts have recognized that not all asserted burdens on religion—even if experienced sincerely and intensely—constitute a “substantial burden” under RFRA. Were it otherwise, a range of essential federal laws that protect employees and prevent discrimination would be subject to strict scrutiny. Although Plaintiffs may object to providing insurance that might be used by employees for the purchase of contraception, a substantial burden under RFRA does not arise from such incidental harms.

This Court, and the majority of federal appellate courts that have considered motions for injunctions pending appeal in contraception cases, have agreed that the asserted link between Plaintiffs and contraception is attenuated in several respects. First, federal law imposes the insurance regulation on a for-profit manufacturer of fuel systems and power-steering systems, Autocam Corporation, and a for-profit supplier of medical devices, Autocam Medical, rather than on the individual owners or officers who hold personal religious beliefs about contraception. Second, the group health plan must provide Autocam’s

employees with a full menu of medical services, not just contraception alone, thereby distancing the corporation from any particular form of covered care. Third, the group health plan pays for contraception only if an employee makes a private, independent decision to use contraception, and even that decision is often preceded by an independent physician's decision to prescribe contraception.

Plaintiffs' alleged burden is no less attenuated because Autocam has decided to fund its own insurance plan, rather than to contract with a third-party insurance company. The group health plan is legally distinct from Autocam, and even further removed from Autocam's individual owners and officers. In any event, to the extent that Autocam perceives a burden from self-funding a plan that includes coverage for contraception, the company is free to purchase comprehensive insurance policies from a third-party carrier.

If RFRA were nonetheless interpreted to require an exemption for Plaintiffs, the statute would transform from a shield (to protect persons against actual substantial burdens) to a sword (for persons to use to impose their religious views on others). An exemption for Plaintiffs would significantly burden the employees of Autocam—many of whom

may not share Plaintiffs' religious beliefs—by making it more difficult, if not impossible, for them to obtain contraception, and would insert employers into otherwise private medical decisionmaking by employees and their physicians. Moreover, if accepted, Plaintiffs' rationale could allow other employers to withhold insurance coverage for any number of other medical treatments—from blood transfusions to psychiatric care to any medicine ingested in the form of gelatin capsules—and could also require widespread exemptions from an array of federal employment and civil-rights laws. These results would not only undermine Congress's intent in enacting RFRA, but would also raise serious concerns under the Establishment Clause.

Plaintiffs have every right to refrain from using contraception and to attempt to persuade others to do the same. But once they enter the secular market for labor to staff their secular, for-profit corporations, they may not force their religious choices on their employees, who are entitled to make their own “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, [and] child rearing.” *Lawrence v. Texas*, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).

## Background

In 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), in order to “increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care.” *Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius*, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012). Among other things, the Act requires employers with at least fifty employees to provide health-insurance coverage in the form of group health plans. *See* 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)–(d). Group plans must provide access, without cost sharing, to comprehensive preventive care, including preventive care related to women’s health. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a). In particular, the women’s health coverage must include “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration ... approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.” 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiffs are Autocam and its controlling owners, the Kennedy family. R. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 14–15, 22, PageID# 5. They object to providing “coverage for contraception, including abortifacient contraception, sterilization, and related education” and claim that offering insurance

that includes contraception coverage is “a mortal sin that subjects them to eternal damnation.” *Id.* at ¶¶ 79, 83, PageID# 15–16. (Although Plaintiffs refer to the morning-after pill as an “abortifacient,” most scientific studies have concluded that it operates prior to fertilization and thus does not induce abortion. *See, e.g.*, Julie Rovner, *Morning-After Pills Don’t Cause Abortion, Studies Say*, All Things Considered (Feb. 21, 2013), <http://www/npr.org/blogs/health/2013/02/22/172595689/morning-after-pills-dont-cause-abortion-studies-say>.)

While the individual Plaintiffs are practicing Catholics, the “Autocam [p]laintiffs are for-profit business entities.” R. 42, Order, PageID# 740. Autocam offers health insurance to full-time employees in the form of a “self-insured[,] ... jointly administered benefits plan which features a group insurance plan.” R. 1, Compl. ¶ 34, PageID#7. The companies also “give each employee up to \$1500 for a health savings account”; employees are free to apply this “undesignated cash ... to uncovered health expenses—including contraception—of their choosing.” R. 42, Order, PageID# 740, 748.

Although the Department of Health and Human Services has promulgated or proposed certain exemptions from the contraception

regulations, in order to ease employers' transition and accommodate religious concerns, Autocam is ineligible for these exemptions. Because Autocam is a for-profit entity, R. 1, Compl. ¶ 33, PageID# 7, Plaintiffs are ineligible for exemptions or accommodations offered to nonprofit religious organizations. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(iv); 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501, 16,503–04 (Mar. 21, 2012); 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8461 (Feb. 6, 2013). And because Autocam made changes to its group health plan during the 2011–2012 plan year, R. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 42, 53, PageID# 9–10, Plaintiffs are ineligible for the grandfathering provision, which exempts certain existing group health plans until the employer “enters into a new policy, certificate, or contract of insurance.” 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,541 (June 17, 2010).

In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs argue that enforcing the contraception regulations against them would violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Free Exercise Clause (among other provisions). *See id.* at ¶¶ 1, 107–33, 158–68, PageID# 2, 20–23, 25–26. The district court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that they had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success under either the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA. R. 42, Order, PageID# 745–52.

According to the district court, the distinction between “paying directly for contraceptive services their employees choose, and [] paying indirectly for the same services through wages or health savings accounts” did not produce a substantial burden: in both situations “Plaintiffs are responsible to pay wages or benefits that their employees earn; and in neither situation do the wages and benefits earned pay—directly or indirectly—for contraception ... unless an employee makes an entirely independent decision to purchase them.” *Id.*, PageID# 749.

The district court also rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that courts “cannot look beyond [Plaintiffs’] sincerely held assertion of a religiously based objection to the mandate to assess whether it actually functions as a substantial burden on the exercise of religion.” *Id.*, PageID# 750. Applying RFRA in this manner, the court explained, “would subject virtually every government action to a potential private veto based on a person’s ability to articulate a sincerely held objection tied ... to a particular religious belief.” *Id.*, PageID# 751.

By a vote of 2 to 1, a motions panel of this Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction pending appeal, pointing to “the lower courts’ reasoned opinion.” R. 44, Order, PageID# 762. Plaintiffs are complying

with federal law for now, but warn that “[t]hey will be forced to revisit that decision if they cannot secure relief on appeal.” Appellants’ Br. 33 n.8.

Because Plaintiffs have not challenged the district court’s decision with respect to their First Amendment claims, this brief will focus on Plaintiffs’ argument under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

### Argument

#### **I. The Federal Insurance Regulations Impose Only an Incidental, Attenuated Burden on Plaintiffs’ Religious Exercise.**

RFRA prohibits the federal government from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion” unless the government demonstrates that the burden is justified by a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). Here, any burden that the regulations impose on Plaintiffs’ religious exercise is, at most, incidental and attenuated—not the type of substantial burden that triggers strict scrutiny under RFRA. The majority of circuits to consider requests for injunctions pending appeal, including this Court, have agreed.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Compare R. 44, Order, PageID# 763 (denying injunction pending appeal); *Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.*, No. 13-5069

*A. Plaintiffs Do Not Establish A Substantial Burden Merely By Alleging One.*

Plaintiffs assert that the Court must defer to their argument that the contraception regulations would substantially burden their religious exercise, maintaining that “the district court engaged in a wholly illicit inquiry that the law forbids precisely because the civil state has no power to determine an individual’s religious beliefs.” Appellants’ Br. 9. Yet the question is not the sincerity or scope of Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs, but rather whether the contraception regulations burden their religious exercise in a manner that is substantial as a matter of law.

RFRA does not require the Court to accept Plaintiffs’ open-ended definition of religious burden. Rather, the Court may and must draw legal lines because virtually any conduct by a particular plaintiff can, in some manner, facilitate someone else’s performance of an act that

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(D.C. Cir. Mar. 21, 2013) (same); *Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius*, No. 13-1144, slip op. at 4 (3d Cir. Feb. 7, 2013) (same); *Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius*, No. 12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (same), *aff’d* 133 S. Ct. 641 (2012) (Sotomayor, Circuit Justice); *with Grote v. Sebelius*, \_\_\_ F.3d \_\_\_, 2013 WL 362725 (7th Cir. Jan. 30, 2013) (granting injunction pending appeal); *Korte v. Sebelius*, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) (same); *Annex Med., Inc. v. Sebelius*, No. 13-1118, slip op. at 5–6 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013); *O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.*, No. 12-3357 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012) (same).

offends that plaintiff's religious beliefs. Plaintiffs in this case object to offering comprehensive health insurance policies; plaintiffs in another case may object to paying salary to an employee who would use the extra money to purchase contraception; plaintiffs in yet another case may object to compensating an employee who would use the funds to purchase books to learn about contraception. In each case, the objecting plaintiff may even believe that an exemption under RFRA "is the difference between keeping the faith and risking eternal damnation." Appellants' Br. 9. But lest the entire federal code submit to strict scrutiny, courts must independently assess whether a plaintiff's articulated religious injury—even if sincerely held and deeply felt—is "substantial" as a matter of law.

Indeed, whereas the initial draft of RFRA prohibited the government from imposing any "burden" on free exercise, substantial or otherwise, Congress added the adjective "substantially," "mak[ing] it clear that the compelling interest standards set forth in the act provides only to Government actions to place a substantial burden on the exercise of substantial [religious] liberty." 139 Cong. Rec. S14350-01 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). In doing so,

Congress ensured that RFRA “would not require [a compelling governmental interest] for every government action that may have some incidental effect on religious institutions.” S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 9 (1993), *reprinted in* 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898.

The courts have followed Congress’ lead. As the Seventh Circuit explained in the parallel context of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, the word “substantial” cannot be rendered “meaningless”: otherwise, strict scrutiny would arise from “the slightest obstacle to religious exercise”—“however minor the burden it were to impose.” *Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago*, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003); *see also Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp.*, 258 F. App’x 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Congress has cautioned that we are to interpret ‘substantial burden’ in line with the Supreme Court’s ‘Free Exercise’ jurisprudence, which suggests that a ‘substantial burden’ is a difficult threshold to cross.”). Accordingly, even if a plaintiff’s beliefs “are sincerely held, it does not logically follow ... that any governmental action at odds with these beliefs constitutes a substantial burden on their right to free

exercise of religion.” *Goehring v. Brophy*, 94 F.3d 1294, 1299 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996).

In determining whether a claimed burden is substantial, courts evaluate whether the challenged governmental action acts in a manner that is only incidental and attenuated. For instance, in *Kaemmerling v. Lappin*, 553 F.3d 669, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2008), the court rejected the claim of a prisoner who challenged the DNA testing of his blood, because the plaintiff objected not to the extraction of his blood per se, but to the government’s testing of that blood for DNA. *See id.* at 679. Even though the government extracted the plaintiff’s blood for the purpose of testing his DNA, and even though the plaintiff asserted a religious objection to having his blood drawn for such testing, the court concluded that the objected-to practice was one step removed from the plaintiff’s religious exercise: “[t]he extraction and storage of DNA information are entirely activities of the FBI, in which [the plaintiff] plays no role and which occur after the [government] has taken his fluid or tissue sample.” *Id.*

The court rejected claims arising from a similarly incidental burden in *Henderson v. Kennedy*, 253 F.3d 12, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

There, the D.C. Circuit upheld a federal regulation banning the sale of

t-shirts on the National Mall, even though the plaintiffs maintained that they were “obligated by the Great Commission to preach the good news ... to the whole world ... by all available means.” *Id.* at 16 (quotation marks omitted). Whatever the plaintiffs’ general religious directive to preach at any time and any place, this particular ban on solicitation in one particular place imposed only an incidental burden on the plaintiffs’ religious exercise. *See id.*

To prevail, then, Plaintiffs must establish that the challenged federal requirement burdens their religious exercise in a manner that the law recognizes as substantial, rather than incidental and attenuated. As detailed below, Plaintiffs cannot do so.

*B. The Connection Between Plaintiffs and Contraception is Incidental and Attenuated.*

The burden that Plaintiffs experience subjectively is not substantial, as a matter of law, because several circumstances render the relationship between Plaintiffs and contraception incidental and attenuated. First, the contraception coverage must be provided by the individual Plaintiffs’ secular, for-profit corporations, rather than by the individual Plaintiffs personally. Second, the corporations must provide coverage for a comprehensive set of healthcare services, not

contraception alone. Third, the corporations would cover the cost of contraception only if an employee chooses to purchase contraception, often after receiving a prescription from her physician. In light of this series of intervening steps, the district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail in their claims under RFRA.

1. *Employees' health insurance is provided not by the individual Plaintiffs, but by their secular, for-profit corporation.*

Any purchase of comprehensive health insurance required by federal law is not paid for out of the individual Plaintiffs' pocket. Rather, the coverage requirements apply to Autocam, "for-profit business entities" that manufacture fuel systems, power-steering systems, and medical devices. R. 42, Order, PageID# 740. Each individual Plaintiff "is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally different entity with different rights and responsibilities due to its different legal status." *Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King*, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001). The question is not, as Plaintiffs argue, whether RFRA's definition of "person" includes corporations, Appellants Br. 21–22, but rather whether the federal regulations at issue substantially burden the religious exercise of the particular plaintiffs before the

Court. Here, the individual Plaintiffs' religious beliefs are one step removed from the regulations, which apply to the corporations; and the secular, for-profit manufacturing corporations exercise religion in only the most incidental manner, if at all.

The legal difference between the individual Plaintiffs and Autocam is no mere technicality. Plaintiffs may believe that Autocam is “the business form through which the individual Plaintiffs endeavor to live their vocation as Christians in the world,” Appellants Br. 18 (quotation marks omitted), but under the law “[a] corporation is presumed to be a separate entity from its shareholders.” *Mich. Carpenters Council Health & Welfare Fund v. C.J. Rogers, Inc.*, 933 F.2d 376, 384 (6th Cir. 1991). In Michigan, where Autocam is located and incorporated, “the general rule ... is that separate entities, including that of corporation and shareholder, will be respected.” *Clark v. United Tech. Auto., Inc.*, 594 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Mich. 1999). This distinction between a for-profit corporation and its individual owners applies fully to companies, like Autocam, that are family-owned, as a corporation is “an entity distinct and separate from its owners, even when a single shareholder holds ownership of the entire corporation.”

*Hills & Dales Gen. Hosp. v. Pantig*, 812 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011).

Plaintiffs, moreover, may not receive corporate benefits while shedding unwanted corporate obligations: “One who has created a corporate arrangement, chosen as a means of carrying out his business purposes, does not have the choice of disregarding the corporate entity in order to avoid the obligations [imposed upon it] for the protection of the public.” *Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States*, 326 U.S. 432, 437 (1946). As Judge Garth explained, concurring in the Third Circuit’s denial of an injunction pending appeal in another corporate challenge to the contraception regulations, “[i]t would be entirely inconsistent to allow [Plaintiffs] to enjoy the benefits of incorporation, while simultaneously piercing the corporate veil for the limited purpose of challenging these regulations.” *Conestoga*, No. 13-1144, slip op. at 7 (Garth, J., concurring) (quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, although churches and other houses of worship may well be subject to a different analysis, the corporations in this case engage in secular activity (manufacture of automotive equipment and medical devices) for secular ends (financial profit). Plaintiffs argue that

Autocam necessarily exercises religion because the company excludes contraception from the company's health plan, Appellants' Br. 23, but this circular argument ignores the threshold question: whether Autocam is, in fact, exercising religion when it provides employment compensation and benefits.

Indeed, the company's asserted religious identity is far thinner than that of the secular corporation whose injunction request was denied in *Gilardi v. Sebelius*, \_\_\_ F. Supp. 2d \_\_\_, 2013 WL 781150 (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2013), *appeal docketed*, No. 13-5069 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 2013). There, the court considered claims asserted by a for-profit produce distributor that makes annual donations to nonprofit organizations, "including the YMCA, Habitat for Humanity, the American Legion, and Holy Angel's Soup Kitchen," "donates a trailer for use by the local Catholic parish ... and uses its trucks to deliver food donated by [the corporation] to food banks." *Id.* at \*6. This incidental support for religion was "insufficient to establish religious activity taken by the [plaintiff corporation]," *id.*, and the court concluded that the corporation was "engaged in purely commercial conduct," *id.* at \*7.

In sum, the individual Plaintiffs have taken advantage of the unique benefits offered by the corporate form, and they have used that corporate form for the purpose of making money in secular markets for automotive equipment and medical devices. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hen followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.” *United States v. Lee*, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).

*2. Contraception is only one benefit within a comprehensive insurance plan.*

Autocam is required to provide its employees with a comprehensive insurance policy that covers contraception as one item among a much wider range of health care procedures and services. Health plans must cover an extensive list of preventive care, including “immunizations,” “evidence-informed preventive care and screenings” for infants and children, and “evidence-based items or services that have in effect a rating of ‘A’ or ‘B’ in the current recommendations of the United States Preventive Services Task Force.” 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-

13(a).<sup>3</sup> In a plan this comprehensive, the connection between the corporation and any particular covered benefit is attenuated.

The Supreme Court has held that an entity authorizing a wide range of expenditures does not necessarily promote any particular item obtained with those funds. In *Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia*, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), the Supreme Court held that a public university would not endorse religion by funding a religious student-group's publications to the same extent that the university funded non-religious groups' publications. *See id.* at 841–43. Similarly, in *Board of Education v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens*, 496 U.S.

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<sup>3</sup> Group health plans must cover, among many other services, “screening for abdominal aortic aneurysm,” “behavioral counseling ... to reduce alcohol misuse,” “screening for iron deficiency anemia,” “the use of aspirin for men age 45 to 79 ... [and] for women age 55 to 79,” “screening for asymptomatic [bacteria] ... for pregnant women,” “screening for high blood pressure,” “screening for cervical cancer,” “screening ... for lipid disorders,” “screening for colorectal cancer,” “oral fluoride supplementation,” “screening of adolescents ... for major depressive disorder,” “screening for type 2 diabetes,” “behavioral dietary counseling,” “screening for hearing loss in all newborn infants,” “intensive counseling and behavioral interventions to promote sustained weight loss for obese adults,” “screen[ing] for osteoporosis,” and “tobacco cessation interventions.” *USPSTF A and B Recommendations*, U.S. Preventive Servs. Task Force, <http://www.preventiveservicestaskforce.org/uspstf/uspsabrecs.htm> (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).

226 (1990), the Court held that the Establishment Clause permitted student religious groups to meet on public-school premises during noninstructional time, under the same terms as non-religious groups, in part because even “secondary school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.” *Id.* at 250. The provision of comprehensive insurance policy, rather than coverage for contraception alone, similarly attenuates the connection between Autocam and any particular medical procedure or service ultimately covered by the insurance plan.

*3. Contraception is used and financed only after an employee’s independent decision.*

Any health-plan reimbursement for the purchase of contraception takes place only after one or more of the company’s employees chooses to use contraception; that is, as a result of “the independent conduct of third parties with whom the plaintiffs have only a commercial relationship.” *Hobby Lobby Stores*, 2012 WL 6930302 at \*3. That independent conduct—private medical decisions made by doctor and patient—further distances Autocam from any purchase or use of contraception.

Courts have determined that intervening private, independent action can break the chain between the original funding source and the ultimate use of funds. In *Zelman v. Simmons-Harris*, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), the Supreme Court upheld an Ohio school-voucher program under which parents could use their vouchers at religious or non-religious schools, in part because “[w]here tuition aid is spent depends solely upon where parents who receive tuition aid choose to enroll their child.” *Id.* at 646. Any incidental advancement of religion, the Court concluded, was “reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits.” *Id.* at 652. Similarly, in *American Jewish Congress v. Corporation for National & Community Service*, 399 F.3d 351 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the D.C. Circuit upheld the grant of education awards to AmeriCorps participants who taught in religious schools, because “those participants who choose to teach in religious schools do so only as a result of their own ... private choice.” *Id.* at 358.

Courts have likewise pointed to the significance of independent medical decisions in rejecting RFRA-based challenges to regulations aimed at ensuring access to reproductive health services. In *Goehring*,

the Ninth Circuit rejected a RFRA challenge to a public university's mandatory student-activity fee, part of which subsidized student health-insurance plans that covered abortion services. *See* 94 F.3d at 1298. Although the plaintiffs argued that "their sincerely held religious beliefs prevent them from financially contributing to abortions," *id.*, the court held that the mandatory fee did not violate RFRA; among other reasons, the insurance subsidy was "distributed only for those students who elect to purchase University insurance." *Id.* at 1300. Any connection between Autocam and contraception is equally incidental and attenuated because of the intervening actions of the company's employees.

With respect to the many forms of contraception that require a prescription, there is yet another intervening influence: the employee's physician, who must prescribe contraception before the employee can obtain it. *See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr.*, 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) (rejecting "the questionable assumption that doctors would prescribe unnecessary medications"). As reflected in virtually all states' product-liability laws, prescribing physicians act as "learned intermediar[ies]" with independent responsibility for evaluating the medical risks in light

of the patient's needs. *Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig. v. Abbott Labs.*, 447 F.3d 861, 867 (6th Cir. 2006).

An employee's use of her employment benefits, moreover, is a quintessential example of a decision to which an employer's connection is incidental and attenuated. In upholding a state-issued tuition grant to a blind person who used the grant to attend a religious school to become a pastor, the Supreme Court held that "a State may issue a paycheck to one of its employees, who may then donate all or part of that paycheck to a religious institution, all without constitutional barrier; and the State may do so even knowing that the employee so intends to dispose of his salary." *Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind*, 474 U.S. 481, 486–87 (1986).

Plaintiffs' arguments underscore that they seek to control employees' use of their own compensation and benefits. According to Plaintiffs, "Autocam's female employees" have no "healthcare problem that needs addressing" because the companies provide a health savings account "that can be used to pay for any lawful service." Appellants Br. 27; *see also* R. 44, Order, PageID# 764 (Rogers, J., dissenting from denial of injunction pending appeal) (arguing that Autocam's employees

can pay for contraception “through individual health care accounts provided by the employer”). Yet the annual cost of contraception may well exceed the value of an employee’s health savings account, or she may need to use those funds for some other medical purpose. *See, e.g.*, Center for American Progress, *The High Costs of Birth Control 2* (2012), available at [http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/02/pdf/BC\\_costs.pdf](http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/02/pdf/BC_costs.pdf) (detailing potential annual costs of contraception and sterilization without insurance). The need to preserve employees’ control over the use of their own compensation and benefits is especially important when it comes to medical decisions, which federal law entitles employees to keep private from their employers. *See* 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.508, 164.510.

*C. Autocam May At Any Time Contract With a Third-Party Insurance Company To Provide Health Coverage.*

Plaintiffs’ burden is no more significant merely because Autocam funds its own employee health plan, rather than providing health-insurance policies issued by a third-party insurance company. Under either scenario, the intervening factors discussed above remain in place: (1) the coverage obligation applies to the corporation, rather than to the individuals holding the religious beliefs; (2) the policy covers a

comprehensive array of medical benefits, not contraception alone; and (3) contraception is used only after an employee's independent decisions, often in consultation with her physician.

In addition, the decision to self-insure does not mean that Autocam is directly providing insurance to its employees. Rather, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1002, the group health plan is legally distinct from Autocam. *See* 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (“An employee benefit plan may sue or be sued under this subchapter as an entity.”); *Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund*, 493 U.S. 365, 373 (1990) (employee “[pension] fund and the [employer] are distinct legal entities”). The plan is designed as a separate entity in part to ensure that employees’ private healthcare decisions are not disclosed to their employer; federal regulations promulgated under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d, ensure that information about employees’ health care is kept private from their employers. *See* 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.508, 164.510.

Plaintiffs, moreover, can avoid any perceived burden of self-funding by obtaining health coverage for its employees from a third-

party carrier: “the self-funding arrangement is one of the employer’s making—and possibly one having little or nothing to do with the employer’s religious beliefs,” *Grote*, 2013 WL 362725, at \*11 (Rovner, J., dissenting from grant of injunction pending appeal). And if Plaintiffs exercise their option to contract with a third-party carrier, any payment for contraception would be made not by the individual Plaintiffs or Autocam, but by the third-party insurance company, which itself would make the payment only after independently determining that the purchased contraception is medically appropriate and thus subject to reimbursement. *See, e.g., Rosenberger*, 515 U.S. at 840, 843–45 (university’s funding of expenses accrued by religious publication was indirect and permitted by Establishment Clause, in part because university did not reimburse religious publication directly, but instead paid third-party printing press with whom student group had contracted). Although Autocam may have chosen to self-insure to save money, or for some other economic reason, a law does not substantially burden religious exercise merely by “mak[ing] the practice of ... religious beliefs more expensive.” *Braunfeld v. Brown*, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961).

## **II. The Application of RFRA To Such Incidental, Attenuated Burdens Would Risk Imposing Significant Hardship on Third Parties, In This and Other Cases.**

A decision exempting Plaintiffs from the insurance-coverage requirements would allow Plaintiffs to intrude upon their employees' most private and sensitive medical decisions—including decisions about treatments other than contraception—and would place RFRA in tension with the Establishment Clause. Moreover, the logic of Plaintiffs' argument, if accepted, would undermine enforcement of civil-rights statutes designed to protect employees, customers, and other members of the public.

### *A. RFRA Does Not Authorize Plaintiffs To Impose Their Religious Views on the Corporation's Employees.*

RFRA does not authorize, let alone require, exemptions that impose significant harms on third parties. When debating the law, Congress envisioned exemptions imposing few if any burdens on third parties. *See, e.g.*, 139 Cong. Rec. E1234-01 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of Rep. Cardin) (burial of veterans in “veterans’ cemeteries on Saturday and Sunday ... if their religious beliefs required it”); *id.* (precluding autopsies “on individuals whose religious beliefs prohibit autopsies”); 139 Cong. Rec. S14350-01 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993)

(statement of Sen. Hatch) (allowing parents to home school their children); *id.* (volunteering in nursing homes). None of the exemptions contemplated by Congress would have required a third-party to forfeit federal protections or benefits otherwise available widely.

Likewise, in interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court has long distinguished between religious-based exemptions that burden third parties and those that do not. *See, e.g., Lee*, 455 U.S. at 261 (rejecting request for religious exemption from the payment of social-security taxes, and observing that the desired exemption would “operate[] to impose the employer’s religious faith on the employees”); *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205, 224 (1972) (“A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different.”). And in the context of Title VII, the Supreme Court has held that the statute’s reasonable-accommodation requirement did not entitle an employee to an exemption that would have burdened other employees, including “the senior employee [who would] have been deprived of his contractual rights under the collective-bargaining agreement.” *Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison*, 432 U.S. 63, 80 (1977).

Courts have applied this principle with equal force in the context of women's access to reproductive healthcare. In *St. Agnes Hospital v. Riddick*, 748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990), the court upheld a medical-residency accreditation standard that required hospitals to teach various obstetric and gynecological procedures. *See id.* at 321, 330. Applying strict scrutiny to the plaintiff's free-exercise claim (prior to the Supreme Court's decision in *Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)), the court observed that allowing the hospital to opt out would deprive the hospital's students of training, and that this lack of training would also harm those students' future patients. *See Riddick*, 748 F. Supp. at 330–32. Similarly, in upholding a state law requiring employers who provided prescription-drug insurance to include coverage for contraception, the California Supreme Court observed, “[w]e are unaware of any decision in which this court, or the United States Supreme Court, has exempted a religious objector from the operation of a neutral, generally applicable law despite the recognition that the requested exemption would detrimentally affect the rights of third

parties.” *Catholic Charities v. Superior Court*, 85 P.3d 67, 93 (Cal. 2004).

Interpreting RFRA to require an exemption for Plaintiffs from the contraception regulations would also place RFRA in tension with the Establishment Clause, which prohibits the government from awarding religious exemptions that unduly interfere with the interests of third parties. For instance, in *Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock*, 489 U.S. 1 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause prohibits a sales tax exemption limited to religious periodicals, because the government may not provide an exemption that “either burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly or cannot reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion.” *Id.* at 15 (citation omitted). Likewise, in *Estate of Thornton v. Caldor*, 472 U.S. 703 (1985), the Court invalidated a statute requiring employers to accommodate sabbatarians in all instances, because “the statute takes no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath.” *Id.* at 709.<sup>4</sup> As in these

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<sup>4</sup> *Cf. Cutter v. Wilkinson*, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (upholding RLUIPA against an Establishment Clause challenge because, among other things, the statute contemplated that prison officials would “take

cases, the exemption requested by Autocam would disregard its employees' "convenience or interests." *Id.*

*B. Plaintiffs' Argument, If Accepted, Would Enable Employers To Restrict Employees' Access to Medical Care Other Than Contraception and Could Undermine Other Civil Rights Laws.*

The logic of Plaintiffs' argument would transcend the provision of coverage for contraception. A Jehovah's Witness could choose to exclude blood transfusions from his corporation's health-insurance coverage. Catholic-owned corporations could deprive their employees of coverage for end-of-life hospice care and for medically-necessary hysterectomies. Scientologist-owned corporations could refuse to offer coverage for antidepressants or emergency psychiatric treatment. Corporations owned by certain Muslims, Jews, or Hindus might refuse to provide coverage for medications or medical devices that contain porcine or bovine products—including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, prostheses, sutures, and pills coated with gelatin, *see Catherine Easterbrook & Guy Maddern, Porcine and Bovine Surgical Products*, 143 *Archives of Surgery* 366, 367 (2008); S. Pirzada Sattar, *To The Editor*, 53 *Psychiatric Services* 213, 213 (2002); "[m]ore than 1000 medications

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adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries").

contain inactive ingredients derived from pork or beef, the consumption of which is prohibited by several religions.” Tara M. Hoesli, et al., *Effects of Religious and Personal Beliefs on Medication Regimen Design*, 34 *Orthopedics* 292, 292 (2011). Christian Scientist-owned corporations could seek to avoid providing coverage for most if not all medical treatments.

Moreover, the burden claimed by Plaintiffs could extend to any indirect support (financial, or otherwise) for any activity at odds with an employer’s or owner’s religious beliefs, allowing company owners to seek exemptions not just from benefits requirements, but from a wide array of other employment laws. A corporation whose owner believes that mothers should not work outside the home could claim a “substantial burden” resulting from compliance with laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. A corporation owned by a Jehovah’s Witness could refuse to offer federally mandated medical leave to an employee who needed a blood transfusion. And any otherwise secular corporation with religious owners could refuse to hire someone from a different religion, so as to avoid paying salary that might be used for a purpose offensive to the owner’s religious views.

Finally, Plaintiffs' argument, if accepted, could undermine federal antidiscrimination laws in areas outside of employment. A Jewish-owned apartment company might refuse to rent to individuals who celebrate Easter in their homes—on the ground that providing space to celebrate Christian holidays would violate the religious beliefs of the apartment company's owners. A Christian-owned hotel chain might refuse to offer rooms to those who would use the space to study the Koran or Talmud. A Muslim-owned cab company might refuse to drive passengers to Hadassah meetings; a Christian-owned car service might refuse to haul clients to mosques; a Jewish-owned bus company might refuse to take customers to Sunday school.

Such a broad interpretation of RFRA would conflict not only with congressional intent, but with the vision of the Founding Fathers, who recognized the need to cabin religious exemptions that impose substantial harms on third parties. In the words of James Madison, "I observe with particular pleasure the view you have taken of the immunity of Religion from civil jurisdiction, *in every case where it does not trespass on private rights* or the public peace." Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), *reprinted in* 9 The

Writings of James Madison 98, 100 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1910), *available at* [http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI\\_religions66.html](http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions66.html) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs' employees are entitled to the same protection against trespass on their private rights.

Conclusion

The judgment of the district court should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Gregory M. Lipper

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Certificate of Compliance

This brief was prepared in Microsoft Word, Century Schoolbook, 14-point font. According to the word-count function and in accordance with the computation rules set forth in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B)(iii), the brief contains 6,881 words.

/s/ Gregory M. Lipper

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Certificate of Service

On March 21, 2013, I served a copy of this brief of *amici curiae* on all counsel of record through the Court's ECF system.

/s/ Gregory M. Lipper

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Designation of Relevant District Court Documents

<u>Document Name</u>	<u>Record No.</u>	<u>PageID# Range</u>
Verified Complaint	1	1-26
Order Denying Prelim. Injunction	42	740-752